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ANTITRUST LAW-INTERNATIONAL LAw-AcT OF STATE Doc-
TRINE-FOREIGN ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS-International Association of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) - In an era of far-reaching and ever-
widening global economic and political interdependence,1 the time 
worn question of extraterritorial application of national laws has 
reemerged with increased vigor. Perhaps nowhere is this problem more 
pronounced than with respect to the international reach of the United 
States antitrust laws. 2 In a reaffirmation and further clarification of the 
contemporary approach to the transnational application of United 
States antitrust law,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in International Association of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers v. OPEC;' refused to extend the scope of the Sherman Act11 to 
cover the activities of a foreign sovereign operating wholly abroad. 
Troubled by the high prices its members were forced to pay for oil 
1. "The most striking fact about the global social process in which contemporary man 
pursues his basic values is in its comprehensive and ineradicable interdependences." Mc-
Dougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: Human Rights in 
Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 227, 266 (1977). See generally L. BROWN, THE 
INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS (1972) (Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 
212); M. CAMPS, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERDEPENDENCE: A PRELIMINARY VIEW (1974); R. 
COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ATLANTIC COM-
MUNITY (1968); Cooper, Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies, 
24 WORLD PoLmcs 159 (1972); Katzenstein, International Interdependence: Some 
Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes, 29 INT'L 0RG. 1021 (1975); Morse, The Politics 
of Interdependence, 23 INT'L 0RG. 311 (1969). · 
2. For a discussion of the nature of the problem, see generally K. BREWSTER, ANTI-
TRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 20-55 (1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE 
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1958); Carlston, Foreign Economic Policy and the Antitrust 
Laws, 40 MINN. L. REV. 125 (1956); Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 
569, 713 (1954); Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Viola-
tions-Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519 (1971). 
3. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 
(1962) (for a discussion of Continental, see text accompanying note 43 infra); United 
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (for a discussion of American Banana, see notes 31-33 and 
accompanying text infra); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 984 (1977) (for a discussion of Hunt, see notes 72-83 and accompanying text 
infra); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (for a discus-
sion of Timberlane, see notes 88-97 and accompanying text infra); United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of Am. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (for a discussion of Alcoa, see notes 37-40 
and accompanying text infra). 
4. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1036 (1982). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Sherman Act represents the major legislative attempt to 
control the forces of monopoly power. It prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspira-
cies in restraint of trade, as well as acts of monopolization and attempts to monopolize. 
For the text of section 1 of the Act, see note 8 infra. 
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and petroleum derived products, the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers (!AM), in 1978, brought suit against 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its in-
dividual member nations in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California,6 alleging a conspiracy on the part of 
OPEC7 to fix the price of crude oil in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.8 IAM sought both money damages and injunctive relief" 
under sectl.bns 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act.10 
Initially, the district court dismissed the action as to OPEC, the 
organization, as it had not been properly served.11 Retained as defen-
dants, however, were the thirteen individual OPEC member nations.12 
Also at an early stage in the proceedings, the court concluded that it 
6. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979). For an analysis of 
the district court opinion, see Note, JAM v. OPEC: Political Question or Commercial 
Activity?, 1 N.Y.J. hrr'L & CoMP. L. 173 (1980). 
7. 477 F. Supp. at 559. 
8. Id. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides: 
Id. 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or 
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one 
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
9. 477 F. Supp. at 559. 
10. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976), provides: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of 
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or 
has an agent, without ;respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
Id.§ 15. 
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and 
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over 
the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
laws, including sections 13, 14, 18 and 19 of this title, when and under the same 
conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that 
will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules gov-
erning such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against dam-
ages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of 
irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may 
issue ••.• 
Id.§ 26. 
11. 477 F. Supp. at 560. 
12. Id. 
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would focus solely on the question of injunctive relief since an award of 
money damages was foreclosed by the indirect-purchaser rule.18 
After trial, the court granted judgment for defendants, premised 
on three independent findings. The court found first, that it lacked ju-
risdiction over the defendant nations under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA).14 Furthermore, the court noted that even if juris-
13. Id. The indirect-purchaser rule was first formally articulated in Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and represented an extension of an earlier Supreme Court 
case, Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
Hanover Shoe established a doctrine which rejected as a defense of an antitrust 
violator the claim that the plaintiff had not been harmed, as the plaintiff would only 
pass on any increased costs. The Court held that a direct purchaser was injured by the 
full amount of any overcharge paid by it and an antitrust defendant would not be per-
mitted to introduce evidence that it was the indirect purchasers who were in fact in-
jured. The Court reasoned that unless direct purchasers were allowed to sue, violators 
"would retain the fruits of their illegality," since indirect purchasers "would have only a 
tiny stake in the lawsuit," and hence, little incentive to sue. Id. at 494. 
The question presented to the the Illinois Brick Court was whether the pass-on the-
ory, rejected by Hanover Shoe when employed defensively, might be employed offen-
sively by a plaintiff indirect purchaser. In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme 
Court held that any rule adopted would necessarily apply to both plaintiff and defen-
dant. To the extent that Hanover Shoe precluded its use by a defendant, the Court was 
compelled to foreclose its use by a plaintiff as well. 431 U.S. at 736. 
14. 477 F. Supp. at 564-66. The FSIA sets out standards to be applied by United 
States courts in ascertaining whether jurisdiction exists relative to foreign sovereigns. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976), provides: 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount 
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in 
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to 
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-
1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement. 
Id. Section 1602 provides in relevant part: 
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the 
claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would 
serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states 
and litigants in United States courts. Under futernational law, states are not 
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activ-
ities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the 
satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their com-
mercial activities. 
Id. § 1602. Section 1605 denotes the general exceptions to the granting of jurisdictional 
immunity. It provides in relevant part: 
(a) a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States 
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere 
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 
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diction were found to exist, the action would fail both because foreign 
sovereigns were not persons within the meaning of the Sherman Act,111 
and because there was no proximate causal connection between def en-
dants' activities and domestic oil price increases.16 Finally, the court 
determined that a default judgment would not lie against any nonap-
pearing defendants.17 
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the action by the 
district court.18 However, it chose to focus its decision on the act of 
state doctrine19 rather than on the somewhat related theory of sover-
eign immunity,20 noting that "[t]he act of State doctrine is apposite 
Id.§ 1605. 
15. 477 F. Supp. at 570. The district court determined: 
It is apparent from the statutory language that plaintiff is entitled to relief in 
the instant action only if the defendants are "persons" as that term is used in 
section 1. •.. 
Section 8 of the Sherman Act, and section 1 of the Clayton Act, define "per-
son" or "persons," to "include corporations, associations existing under or au-
thorized by the laws of the Territories, the laws of· any State, or the laws of a 
foreign country. . • • " The case law accords with this interpretation. • • • 
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court held that a 
domestic State is not a person who may be sued under the antitrust laws. • • • 
These same considerations apply with equal force to foreign nations. 
Id. See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 78 n.14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 984 (1977); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 
1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1979). But see Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) where the 
Supreme Court held that a foreign nation may be a "person" under our antitrust laws as 
a plaintiff for the purpose of bringing suit. 
16. 477 F. Supp. at 572. The court was not persuaded by plaintiff's evidence that the 
dramatic rise in gasoline prices was priniarily caused by the setting of crude oil prices by 1 
OPEC. The court noted the failure of !AM to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the alleged illegal conduct by OPEC was a substantial factor in bringing about any 
injury or damage to plaintiff. In fact, the court alluded to a host of other factors which 
may have played a role in pushing gasoline prices upward. Id. at 573. 
17. Id. at 574. Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976), concerning default judgments 
against foreign states, the court refused to enter a default judgment since it remained 
unconvinced that plaintiff had established its "claim or right to relief by evidence satis-
factory to the Court." 477 F. Supp. at 575. 
18. 649 F.2d at 1362. 
19. Id. at 1358. The court stated: 
The act of state doctrine declares that a United States court will not adjudi-
cate a politically sensitive dispute which would require the court to judge the 
legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state. This doctrine was expressed by 
the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez: "Every sovereign State is bound 
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one 
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory." 
Id. (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). For a discussion of Un· 
derhill, see text accompanying notes 55 & 56 infra. 
20. 649 F.2d at 1358-59. The court noted: 
The doctrine of sovereign inlmunity is siniilar to the act of state doctrine in 
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whenever the federal courts must question the legality of the sovereign 
acts of foreign states. "21 The court determined that the act of state 
doctrine was in fact applicable in this case and, therefore, chose not to 
enter the "delicate area" of foreign policy.22 It thus declined to reach 
the issues of sovereign immunity,23 the indirect-purchaser rule,2" the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act,25 and the definition of 
"person" under that act.26 
The attempt to apply domestic law to violations committed abroad 
is by no means a recent phenomenon.27 The long and checkered history 
of international law is replete with efforts to resolve such controver-
sies, 28 in particular, within the area of United States antitrust policy.29 
that it also represents the need to respect the sovereignty of foreign states. The 
two doctrines differ, however, in significant respects. The law of sovereign inimu-
nity goes to the jurisdiction of the court. The act of state doctrine is not 
jurisdictional. 
Id. at 1359. 
21. Id. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the act of state doctrine, see notes 
128-38 and accompanying text infra. 
22. 649 F.2d at 1361. 
23. Id. at 1362. 
24. Id. For a discussion of the indirect-purchaser rule, see note 13 supra. 
25. 649 F.2d at 1362. For a discussion of the Sherman Act, see note 5 supra. 
26. 649 F.2d at 1362. For the definition of "person" under the Sherman Act, see note 
15 supra. 
27. The first major discussion of this concept of "extraterritoriality" appears in The 
S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10 (at 56), which h!'.S come to provide the "author-
ity for the proposition that a State has competence to punish a foreigner for his acts 
abroad if such acts form a constituent element of a crinie consummated within the terri-
tory of the State." Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the 
Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 644 (1952) (footnote omitted). 
28. Traditionally, the decisions in this area have not manifested any clear consensus. 
In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (7 Cranch 74) (1812), the Court 
held that a foreign war vessel was exempt from domestic jurisdiction based on a concept 
of sovereign inimunity. For a discussion of sovereign inlmunity, see notes 49-53 and ac-
companying text infra. In The Appollon, 22 U.S. 361 (9 Wheat. 159) (1824), the Court 
stated: 
The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far 
as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or 
rights of any other nation within its own jurisdiction. And however general and 
comprehensive the phrases used in our municipal laws may be, they must always 
be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom the legislature 
have authority and jurisdiction. 
Id. at 367-70 (9 Wheat. at 162-63). For other cases refusing to extend domestic laws to 
violations committed abroad, see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
347, 356 (1909) ("But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an 
act as unlawful or lawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the 
act is done") (for a discussion of American Banana, see notes 31-34 and accompanying 
text infra); Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 239 (1869) ("It appears to us clear that 
where by the law of another country an act complained of is lawful, such act, though it 
would have been wrongful by our law if committed here, cannot be made the ground of 
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Early antitrust decisions struggled with the problem without reference 
to the act of state doctrine. Instead, the courts chose to treat each case 
within the framework of traditional notions of territorial jurisdiction. 80 
The first of these conventional approaches was that of the Supreme 
Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 31 There, the plain-
tiff's complaint charged that defendant had sought to monopolize the 
banana trade in Panama.32 The Supreme Court dismissed the action 
because the alleged antitrust violations took place wholly outside the 
United States.33 Justice Holmes would not extend the jurisdiction of 
the Court that far. Indeed, he noted that "[a]ll legislation is prima fa-
cie territorial."3• This doctrine of strict territoriality proved to be 
short-lived, however, as the courts soon began to whittle away at such 
an action in an English Court"); Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528 (1879) ("all legisla-
tion is prima f acie territorial"). For cases extending domestic laws beyond their terri-
tory, see United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & N~vigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913) 
("This is but saying that laws have no extraterritorial operation. . • • These conse-
quences we cannot accept"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 
(2d Cir. 1945) ("it is settled law .•. th~t any state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which has consequences 
within its borders") (for a discussion of Alcoa, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text 
infra). 
As to the propriety of extraterritorial application, the commentators are split. For 
an affirmative position, see generally Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 569 (1954) and 713 (1955). For a negative position, see generally Haight, Antitrust 
Laws and the Territorial Principle, 11 VAND. L. REV. 27, 32-34 (1957); Whitney, Sources 
of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954). 
29. Compare American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (for a 
discussion of American Banana, see notes 31-34 and accompanying text infra) with 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (for a discussion of 
Alcoa, see notes 37-49 and accompanying text infra). 
30. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); The Schooner 
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (7 Cranch 74) (1812). 
31. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
32. Id. at 354-55. 
33. Id. at 357. The Court noted: 
Id. 
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction 
of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the terri-
torial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power, and that 
words having universal scope, such as "every contract in restraint of trade," 
"every person who shall monopolize," etc., will be taken as a matter of course to 
mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subse-
quently may be able to catch. 
Because the acts complained of entailed the seizure of plaintiff's plantation by the 
Costa Rican government, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, viewed the question as 
not amenable to litigation in our courts. Id. He relied, in part, on the Underhill decision. 
For a discussion of Underhill, see text accompanying notes 54 & 55 infra. 
34. 213 U.S. at 357 (quoting Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528 (1879)). 
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a restrictive view of the Sherman Act. In Thomsen v. Cayser,35 the Su-
preme Court held a combination formed abroad by foreign owners of 
steamship lines, with the intent to restrict competition through a mo-
nopoly pricing scheme, to be in violation of the Sherman Act. Of im-
portance to the Court in distinguishing Thomsen from American Ba-
nana, was the fact that "the combination affected the foreign 
commerce of this country and was put into operation here."38 
With United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 37 a case involv-
ing the alleged monopolization of interstate and foreign commerce in 
the manufacture and sale of virgin aluminum ingot, all former notions 
of strict territoriality were cast aside. As one commentator noted, 
"[w]ith one stroke, [Judge Hand] read out of past Supreme Court deci-
sions any requirement that the unlawful agreement be formed or to 
some degree carried out within the United States."38 
The test for antitrust jurisdiction formulated by Judge Hand was 
essentially two-fold, requiring a finding of both an intent to affect and 
an actual effect on American commerce. 39 Later cases refined the sec-
35. 243 U.S. 66 (1917). 
36. Id. at 88. The Court relied on United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation 
Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913), which rejected the notion that United States antitrust laws did 
not apply to acts outside the country where the acts of foreigners operating within the 
United States were at issue. See generally Simson, The Return of American Banana: A 
Contemporary Perspective on American Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. lNT'L L. & EcoN. 233, 
236-37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Simson]. 
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
38. Simson, supra note 36, at 237. Judge Hand's reasoning was that even· if an alleged 
violator never set foot in the United States, the effect of his activities abroad would 
imply an inanimate means or presence, which would be, for all intents and purposes, the 
equivalent of actually setting foot here for the purposes of granting jurisdiction. 148 F.2d 
at 444. 
39. 148 F.2d at 443-44. The breadth of this standard should be readily apparent. 
Given the seemingly boundless flow of effects generated by virtually any trade 
agreement or foreign investment in the world wealth process • . . the unhappy 
fate of a defendant left to disprove presumed effects should be patent. . . • 
Thus, whatever vitality the Holmes dicta in Banana may have been thought to 
retain . . • Alcoa • • • relegated • • . to mere historical curiosity. · 
Simson, supra note 36, at 238. Judge Hand felt well guided in his extension of Sherman 
Act jurisdiction: 
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom 'its courts can 
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States. On the 
other hand, it is settled law • • • that any state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other 
states will ordinarily recognize. 
148 F.2d at 443 (citations omitted). For support, Judge Hand relied upon several earlier 
Supreme Court cases: Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Lamar v. United 
States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). In Strassheim, the 
Court held that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and produc-
ing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if 
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ond prong of the Alcoa doctrine and required that the effects be sub-
stantial. 40 In any event, the pendulum seemed to be swinging further 
away from the holding of American Banana.41 With increasing deter-
mination, the courts were holding more and more foreign activity sub-
ject to the wrath of the Sherman Act. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp.,42 for example, the Court held that defen-
dant's reliance on American Banana as providing insulation from lia-
bility was misplaced. The Court wrote that "[a] conspiracy to monopo-
lize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States 
is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the 
conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries."43 Similarly, in 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,44 an action against 
twenty-nine foreign and domestic uranium producers for attempts to 
restrain the uranium trade, the Seventh Circuit pointed to the gradual 
erosion of American Banana, and concluded that the Sherman Act did 
indeed extend to conduct outside the United States, as long as some of 
the alleged violations transpired within the United States,46 and the 
he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its 
power." Id. at 285 (citations omitted). Critics of Judge Hand's expansive interpretation, 
however, have questioned the correctness of his conception of "settled law," as purport-
ing to be a statement of international law. See Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between 
International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 n.1 (1954). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 70,600 at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 11 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (appeal dismissed per stipulation). The United States 
alleged a conspiracy on the part of the defendant to impose unreasonable restraints on 
foreign and domestic commerce by fixing the price of watches sold in the United States. 
The court noted: 
Defendants' combination and conspiracy has operated as a direct and substan-
tial restraint on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States and is 
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff 
Act notwithstanding that some of the conspirators are foreign nationals, that 
some of the agreements were entered into in a foreign country or that the acts of 
defendants were lawful in such foreign country. 
Id. at 77,456. (citations omitted). 
In dicta, the court pointed out that "[i]f, of course,. the defendants' activities had 
been required by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing. An American court 
would have under such circumstances no right to condemn the governmental activity of 
another sovereign nation." Id. Compare with note 87 and accompanying text infra. See 
also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962) (for 
a discussion of Continental, see text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra); Mannington 
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1299 (3d Cir. 1979) (for a discussion of 
Mannington, see notes 97-99 and accompanying text infra). 
41. For a discussion of American Banana, see text accompanying notes 29-33 supra. 
42. 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962). 
43. Id. at 704 (citation omitted). 
44. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). 
45. Id. at 1253. 
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parties were American. Relying on Alcoa, 46 and viewing the concerted 
conduct both abroad and within the United States as manifesting an 
intent to affect the uranium market in this country, the court con-
cluded that defendants did indeed "fall within the jurisdictional ambit 
of the Sherman Act. . . . "47 
There soon emerged, however, yet another approach to questions 
involving extraterritoriality. While prior cases had almost exclusively 
involved the activities of private citizens or corporations abroad, a new 
line of cases developed in response to the increasing frequency with 
which acts of foreign nations themselves were being called into ques-
tion. The fundamental analysis employed by this new collection of 
cases manifested an explicit reliance on the act of state doctrine48 and 
the evolving conception of sovereign immunity. 
The origin of sovereign immunity as it developed in the United 
States can be found in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden,49 which 
involved a United States citizen's asserted right to a ship allegedly 
seized under orders of Napoleon. Chief Justice Marshall's refusal to 
hear the claim110 was explained in an opinion which is recognized as 
establishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States.111 
The Chief Justice noted that each sovereign, as an independent state, 
has exclusive power within its borders, which includes the absolute 
right of the courts to exercise jurisdiction within its territories. How-
ever, because of common interests impelling these nations to mutual 
intercourse "every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a 
part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction" in certain situa-
tions.112 One such situation arises when there is. a claim against a for-
eign sovereign. Barring this exception, the resulting immunity of a sov-
ereign power to suit in another state's court renders the forum state's 
court incapable, on jurisdictional grounds, of entertaining a suit 
against another state.113 
46. Id. For a discussion of Alcoa, see notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. 
47. 617 F.2d at 1254. 
48. See note 19 supra. 
49. 11 U.S. 116 (7 Cranch 74) (1812). 
50. Id. at 146 (7 Cranch at 92). 
51. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 35 (1978); The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the 
Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 544.45 (1977). The Schooner Ex-
change decision added the United States to the majority of nations which at the time 
adhered to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. Id. at 545 n.13. 
52. 11 U.S. at 136 (7 Cranch at 85)'. 
53. 649 F.2d at 1357. See Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense 
in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. lNT'L L. 100, 118 (1967). The degree of immu-
nity seems to vary between nations according to their own peculiar conceptions. "Abso-
lute" immunity, today being applied by a declining number of states, applies a ratione 
personae, that is, a view completely independent of the nature of the acts involved. 
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The act of state doctrine finds its genesis in Underhill v. Her-
nandez.11' There, the court refused to inquire into the acts of Her-
nandez, a revolutionary Venezuelan military commander whose govern-
ment was ultimately recognized by the United States, despite claims 
by Underhill, a United States citizen, that he had been unlawfully as-
saulted, coerced and detained in Venezuela by Hernandez.1111 Chief Jus-
tice Fuller wrote for a unanimous Court: 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one 
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government 
of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances 
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means 
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between 
themselves.116 
Thus the act of state doctrine can be described as a recognition of the 
institutional limitations of the courts. It is a doctrine which avoids ju-
dicial action in sensitive areas, by leaving the executive branch to 
properly decide the matter.117 
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 116 the Supreme Court, in 
a five-to-four decision, reaffirmed the use of the act of state doctrine119 
in even more intricate settings. Sabbatino involved the expropriation 
by the Cuban government of the property of a Cuban corporation 
largely owned by United States residents. In reversing the holding of 
the lower court, Justice Harlan held that the act of state doctrine, as 
enunciated in Underhill, was applicable even when the foreign act in 
question was in violation of international law.6° Fundamentally, Justice 
Gaining in popularity is the "restrictive" view, which grants immunity to states only for 
public or sovereign acts (jure imperii), and not for private or commercial acts. Id. at 118 
nn.109-11. The current United States outlQOk is of the restrictive variety. See The Tate 
Letter, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). For a discussion of The Tate Letter, see note 
112 infra. The position expressed in The Tate Letter was ultimately adopted by the 
Second Circuit in Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). The contours of 
sovereign immunity in the United States are defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). 
54. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
55. Id. at 251. 
56. Id. at 252. 
57. 649 F.2d at 1358. 
58. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
59. Id. at 416-17. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, specifically noted: "None of 
this Court's subsequent cases in which the act of state doctrine was directly or peripher-
ally involved manifest any retreat from Underhill. • . . On the contrary, in two of these 
cases ••• the doctrine as announced in Underhill was reaffirmed in unequivocal terms." 
Id. 
60. Id. at 406. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, pointed out that "[i]f interna-
tional law does not prescribe use of the doctrine, neither does it forbid application of the 
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Harlan was concerned with the role of the Court in foreign diplomatic 
political questions. 61 The appropriate solution, he suggested, was for an 
individual to employ the usual method of seeking relief: "[T]o exhaust 
local remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of his own 
state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before 
an international tribunal. "62 
Implicit in the Sabbatino decision was a balancing test to deter-
mine when invocation of the act of state doctrine would be proper. The 
Court reasoned that the greater the degree of consensus concerning a 
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it would be 
for the Court to render decisions regarding it. In such instances the 
Court could "focus on the application of an agreed principle to circum-
stances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a prin-
ciple not inconsistent with the national interest or with international 
justice. "63 
Justice White, in a vigorous dissent,64 found that the judicial 
power, as defined by the Constitution, included the competence to 
render decisions on questions of international law.611 He noted: 
[N]o other civilized country has found such a rigid rule neces-
sary for the survival of the executive branch of its government; 
the executive of no other government seems to require such in-
sulation from international law adjudications in its courts; and 
rule even if it is claimed that the act of state in question violated international law." Id. 
at 422. 
61. Justice Harlan wrote that the act of state doctrine 
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system 
of separation of powers. It concerns the competency-of dissimilar institutions to 
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international 
relationships. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong 
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the 
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's 
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in 
the international sphere. 
Id. at 423. 
62. Id. at 422-23 (citations omitted). 
63. Id. at 428. 
64. Id. at 439 (White, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 450-51 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote: 
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases . . . affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to 
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction-to Controversies· ... between 
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." And § 
1332 of the Judicial Code gives the courts jurisdiction over all civil actions be-
tween citizens of a State and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof. 
Id. at 451 (White, J., dissenting). 
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no other judiciary is apparently so incompetent to ascertain 
and apply international law.66 
Indeed, Justice White viewed the law of nations as being part of the 
law of the land.67 In support of this proposition, he cited The Paquete 
Habana,68 in which the Court determined that "[i]nternational law is 
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."69 
So controversial was the decision in Sabbatino, that Congress soon 
sought to partially overrule its implications by passing the "Sabbatino 
Amendment. "70 Essentially, the Act bars a court from declining to hear 
a case under the act of state doctrine where the act of state in question 
concerns the possible violation of international law, or involves a dis-
66. Id. at 440 (White, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice White cited six countries 
which have examined a fully "executed act of state expropriating property." Id. at 440 
n.l (White, J., dissenting). 
67. Justice White noted that the doctrine that the law of nations is part of the law of 
the land is supported by the debates during the Constitutional Convention, and in the 
Constitution itself. Id. at 451-52 nn. 12-14 (White, J., dissenting). The extent to which 
the framers intended international law to be applicable within American courts is noted 
in THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 22 (J. Jay), and No. 80, at 112, No. 83, at 144, and No. 82 
(A. Hamilton). Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, in a letter to French Minister 
Genet, wrote that "[t]he law of nations makes an integral part ••• of the laws of the 
land." I MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1906). A 1792 opinion by Attorney 
General Randoph suggested that "[t]he law of nations, although not specially adopted by 
the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land." 1 OP. 
ATI'Y GEN. 27 (1792). 
68. 376 U.S. at 459 (White, J., dissenting) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900)). 
69. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976). Section 2 of the amendment provides: 
Id. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United 
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a 
determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in 
a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party 
including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or 
traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of 
that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the princi-
ples of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection: Pro-
vided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an 
act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law with respect to a claim 
of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of 
credit of not more than 180 days duration or other taking, or (2) in any case with 
respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state 
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the 
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case 
with the court. 
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pute as to a claim of title or right to property.71 
Sabbatino has played an influential role as a basis for decision in 
subsequent cases seeking to invoke extraterritorial jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,72 an action alleging a Sherman Act 
violation, 73 was dismissed by the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York on the basis of the act of state doctrine.7' The plain-
tiff in Hunt was an independent oil producer operating under a conces-
sion from the Libyan government.76 In 1971, Libya decided to increase 
its share of the profits from both the plaintiff and the "Seven Sister" 
(Seven) oil companies, also operating in Libya.76 The Seven proposed 
meetings to form a "united front" against the perceived potential of a 
new hard-line Libyan policy with respect to foreign oil producers.77· Ob-
taining a letter of clearance in 1971 from the Department of Justice 
indicating that no antitrust action against the Seven would be brought 
if independent producers were included in the meetings,78 the Seven 
met secretly in New York. Plaintiff, however, refused to participate.79 
Later that year, Libya nationalized the oil industry in response to the 
Seven's concerted action and refused to permit the plaintiff to export 
any oil.80 Plaintiff then brought an antitrust suit against the Seven.81 
Judge Mulligan, writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, up-
held the district court's dismissal,82 noting that any adjudication would 
71. Id. The amendment itself has already proven to be yet a new source of litigation. 
See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 
1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). There, the court 
construed very narrowly the exception provided by the amendment, and noted the neces-
sity for strict construction. The act of state doctrine would continue to apply in any case 
that did not precisely fit the statutory language. Two cases serve to illustrate the court's 
analysis. In French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968), the court refused to apply the amendment exception since it "refers 
to cases in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted . . . based upon 
(or traced through) a confiscation or other taking .••• " 23 N.Y.2d at 57, 242 N.E.2d at 
712, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 444. In F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), the amendment was not jnvoked 
since there was found to be no violation of international law. 
72. 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 984 (1977). 
73. For the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, see note 8 supra. 
74. 410 F. Supp. at 23-25. 
75. Id. at 14-15. 
76. Id. at 15-16. 
77. 550 F.2d at 71. 
78. 410 F. Supp. at 16. 
79. Id. 
80. 550 F.2d at 71. 
81. Id. at 71-72. 
82. The district court held that the conspiracy did not cause any of the resulting 
damage, and plaintiff would have to establish that but for the conspiracy, Libya would 
not have committed any aggressive acts. 410 F. Supp. at 24. These acts would require 
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have required an inquiry into the activities of a foreign sovereign.88 
Hence, under the reasoning of Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine was 
available here to effectively bar the plaintiff from adjudicating his 
claim. 
The dissent viewed the act of state doctrine's availability to the 
defendant in this case as somewhat tenuous. It noted that the doctrine 
does not set up a jurisdictional bar to judicial review,8" nor does it pro-
hibit judicial scrutiny. Rather, it requires only that the court examine 
the nature of the alleged conduct and its relation to the foreign sover-
eign. 85 Should it be found that they are in fact the acts of a foreign 
sovereign, only then does it provide a proscription against a judicial 
determination of the validity of the acts. 86 In short, the dissent was 
unwilling to confer antitrust immunity upon violators who could hide 
behind the shield of "foreign compulsion."87 
judicial inquiry into the conduct of Libyan officials and as such, would be foreclosed by 
the act of state doctrine. Id. 
83. 550 F.2d at 73. In concluding that plaintiff's complaint concerned nonjusticieble 
sovereign acts, Judge Mulligan relied upon Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), where the Court distinguished a sovereign's public acts (non-
justicieble) from its commercial functions (justiciable). Judge Mulligan noted that Dun-
hill clearly established that the expropriation of the property of an alien has been tradi-
tionally considered one of the public acts of a sovereign and therefore exempt from any 
judicial scrutiny. 550 F.2d et 73. Alternatively, the acts under question here were clearly 
those of a sovereign since Libya had proclaimed them to be a political reprisal against 
the United States. Id. For a discussion of Dunhill, see notes 108-15 and accompanying 
text infra. 
84. 550 F.2d at 79 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 57 
supra. 
85. 550 F.2d at 79 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 79-80 (Van Graefeiland, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). The issue of "foreign compulsion" as a de-
fense to an antitrust action is an interesting one. The dissent accepted the holding of 
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), that "state authorization, approval, 
encouragement or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immu-
nity upon the wrongdoer." 550 F.2d et 80 (Van Greefeiland, J., dissenting) (citing Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. et 592). At issue in Cantor was a private violation of the 
Sherman Act, where the action had been approved by the state. The defendant, a private 
utility supplying electricity to southeastern Michigan, furnished free lightbulbs to its res-
idential customers. 428 U.S. at 582. Its marketing practice had been sanctioned by the 
state public service commission. Plaintiff, a retail druggist selling light bulbs, brought 
the action alleging a restraint of competition in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 581. 
The Supreme Court refused to find a state exemption to the antitrust laws. Id. at 600-03. 
"Approval" versus "compulsion" has often been at issue in the international sphere 
as well. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), an 
antitrust action against international uranium producers, the act of state doctrine was 
found not to apply. While the governments of the defendant companies had been sympe-. 
thetic to the economics of the defendant, there was no finding that defendants' coriduct 
had been mandated by the governments. "[W]hen a foreign sovereign simply approves or 
condones certain conduct, the act of state doctrine is not a defense." 617 F.2d at 1254 
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In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 88 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals came to grips with the fundamental elements 
underlying the Sabbatino case,89 and fashioned its own balancing test 
to determine which situations would require an act of state defense. 
Judge Choy, writing for the court, rejected as inapplicable the act of 
state defense employed by the district court. Specifically, Judge Choy 
pointed out that "the doctrine does not bestow a blank-check immu-
nity upon all conduct blessed with some imprimatur of a foreign gov-
n.21. 
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. 
Del. 1979), where plaintiff's suppliers were compelled by Venezuelan authorities to en-
gage in a boycott designed to deny plaintiff the Venezuelan crude oil required for his 
refining operations, the court held that where it is found that a defendant has been 
"compelled by regulatory authorities ... to boycott plaintiff ..• such compulsion is a 
complete defense to an action under the antitrust laws." Id. at 1296. The court went on 
to explain: 
When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. 
Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. The Sherman Act does 
not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. 
By its terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of persons and 
corporations. 
Id. at 1298 (footnote omitted). See also Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sov-
ereignty, 49 VA. L. REV. 925 (1962): 
The real question is whose acts are the subject of inquiry. If the acts are those of 
a foreign government within its own jurisdiction, then the antitrust exception 
applies. The situation is the same if the foreign government through its laws, 
regulations, or orders, requires parties to perform the anticompetitive acts. If, on 
the other hand, the acts complained of are in reality those of private parties who 
seek to hide behind the cloak of foreign law, the courts will attach antitrust 
liability. 
Id. at 932 (emphasis in original). See also Report of the Attorney General's Committee 
to Study the Antitrust Laws at 83 (1955), quoted in W. FuGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND 
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 148 (1958). See generally Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & 
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (an official endorsement of the distinction between 
foreign government compulsion and foreign government permission); Industrial Dev. 
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); 
Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 100 (1967); Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Antitrust Conspiracies to Induce 
Foreign Sovereign Acts, 10 INT'L L. & PoL. 495 (1978). 
88. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff alleged that defendant and others in both 
the United States and in Honduras conspired to prevent it from milling lumber there 
and exporting it to the United States, thus maintaining a monopoly over the Honduran 
export business. Plaintiff claimed further, that the intent and effect of the conspiracy 
was to interfere with the export to the United States of Honduran lumber for use there 
by plaintiff, thereby directly and substantially affecting the commerce of the United 
States. The district court accepted the defendant's argument that the injuries allegedly 
suffered" resulted from the acts of the Honduran government in connection with the en-
forcement of security interests in its Mayan plant, and that therefore, American courts 
were precluded from reviewing such actions based on the act of state doctrine. Id. at 605. 
89. See text accompanying note 63 supra. 
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ernment."00 Dissatisfied with the traditional applications of the effects 
test of Alcoa, 91 Judge Choy suggested in its place a balancing of inter-
ests test based on principles of international comity.02 His approach 
entailed the evaluation of three distinct issues, beginning with an in-
quiry into whether the alleged restraint affected, or was intended to 
affect, the foreign commerce of the United States.03 Next, he asked if 
the restraint was of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable 
as a violation of the Sherman Act.94 Finally, Judge Choy posed the 
somewhat normative question, based on notions of international com-
ity and fairness, of whether the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
United States should be asserted to cover the alleged violation.0 G In 
90. 549 F.2d at 606. 
91. Id. at 611-12. Judge Choy's uncertainty as to the adequacy of the Alcoa effects 
test was based upon a fundamental weakness which he found the test to contain. His 
analysis was that such a test fails to take into account interests of nations other than the 
United States. Id. at 612. For the formulation of the effects test, see notes 38 & 39 supra. 
92. 549 F.2d at 612-13. The premise from which Judge Choy started was that, as 
espoused by the Court in Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine is neither compelled by the 
nature of sovereignty nor international law, nor the Constitution itself, but rather, from 
the judiciary's concern for its possible interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by 
the political branches of government. Id. at 605-06 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423). By Judge Choy's interpretation, Sabbatino did not lay down 
any fixed, inflexible rule, but rather specifically addressed itself to a "balance of relevant 
considerations." Id. at 606 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 
428). Judge Choy, therefore, enumerated the various factors to be considered. 
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or 
policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal 
places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either 
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects 
on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which 
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability 
of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct 
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 
Id. at 614. 
93. 549 F.2d at 615. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. Judge Choy found support for his position not only among the commentators, 
see, e.g., K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958); Falk, In· 
ternational Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. 
L.Q. 295, 304, 306 (1959); Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Vio· 
lations-Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 539-45 (1971); 
Simson, The Return of American Banana: A Contemporary Perspective on American 
Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. lNT'L L. & EcoN. 233, 244-46 (1974); Trautman, The Role of Con-
flicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legisla· 
tion, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 588 (1961), but among the case law as well. Judge Choy relied 
on the Supreme Court decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 
370 U.S. 690 (1962). There, the Court held that the involvement of the Canadian govern· 
ment in the alleged monopolization of the United States uranium market did not require 
dismissal of the action. Since the Court found no approval by the government of the 
monopolization, it could be inferred that the Canadian interest was slight, and clearly 
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Timberlane, Judge Choy noted that because there was little indication 
of any conflict with Honduran policy in enforcing a Sherman Act viola-
tion, and because the magnitude of the effects alleged by the claimant 
appeared to be substantial, the court should vacate the dismissal of the 
district court and remand the case for reconsideration.96 
Three years later, in 1979, a modified Timberlane analysis was es-
poused by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum 
Corp. 97 In Mannington, the court used the Alcoa effects test to support 
its finding that it had jurisdiction98 even though the antitrust violation 
occurred abroad and was specifically approved by the foreign govern-
ment. Only then did the court consider a list of comity factors to be 
used in determining whether the jurisdiction, once found, should be 
exercised. 99 
Picking up on the distinction between the varying approaches of 
Timberlane and Mannington, 100 the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in Dominicus Americana Bahia v. Gulf & West-
ern Industries, Inc., 101 accepted the balancing test in general and pro-
outweighed by the American interest in condemning the restraint. Id. at 706-07. For a 
discussion of Continental, see notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text supra. 
In the formulation of his balancing test, Judge Choy placed some reliance on the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965), 
which provides that 
where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the 
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct on the part of a person, 
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating 
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such facto:rS as 
(a) vital national interests of each of the states, 
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement 
actions would impose upon the person, 
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory 
of the other state, 
(d) the nationality of the person, and 
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably 
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that 
state. 
96. 549 F.2d at 615. 
97. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). 
98. Id. at 1291-92. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. 
99. 595 F.2d at 1297-98. For a listing of the factors taken into consideration, see id. 
This view has been contrasted with the Timberlane approach in Dominicus Americana 
Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
However, since the record below was insufficient to allow an applied analysis of such 
factors, the case was remanded to the district court for reconsideration. 595 F.2d at 1298-
99. 
100. In Timberlane, considerations of international comity are reviewed as part of 
the threshold jurisdictional question, 473 F. Supp. at 687, while in Mannington, comity 
will bear relevance only upon a subsequent determination of jurisdictional abstention. 
473 F. Supp. at 688. 
101. 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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ceeded to evaluate the various factors that would impact upon the pro-
priety of asserting jurisdiction.102 Dominicus evinced a relatively 
expansionist view of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Act. It extended the "effects" holding of Alcoa103 and concluded that 
the territorialism of American Banana10" had indeed been rendered 
obsolete.105 The only apparent limit on jurisdiction set by the court 
would be in what it termed "the extreme case."108 Only "a lawsuit that 
challenges the validity per se of an act of a foreign government is non-
justiciable. "107 For the Southern District, act of state again played a 
crucial role, as evidenced by its reliance on Alfred Dunhill of London, 
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.108 
, Dunhill involved an action brought by leading cigar manufacturers 
against Cuban cigar importers for the purchase price of cigars that had 
been shipped to the importers from the manufacturers' plants which 
had been nationalized by the Cuban government.109 In a five-to-four 
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that 
the act of state doctrine would not apply to the Cuban government's 
repudiation of a debt, allegedly owing to petitioner, since such repudia-
tion was not considered to be a genuine act of state.110 
The Court wrote: 
If a state chooses to go into the business of buying and selling 
102. Id. at 688. Some of the factors enumerated included the degree of conflict with 
foreign law, the relative importance of the alleged antitrust violations in the Dominican 
Republic, the availability of a remedy there, and the existence of any agreement between 
the United States and the Dominican Republic regarding antitrust policy. Id. Some of 
the factors relied upon by Judge Carter were the same as those espoused by the Man· 
nington court. For a list of the factors considered there, see 595 F.2d at 1297-98. 
103. 473 F. Supp. at 687. See text accompanying note 38 supra. In Dominicus, the 
court stated: 
According to the Alcoa rule, even wholly foreign conduct may come within the 
sweep of the antitrust laws if it has a sufficient effect on the interstate or foreign 
commerce of the United States. • • • Indeed it is probably not necessary for the 
effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not 
de minimus. 
473 F. Supp. at 687 (citation omitted). 
104. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See text accom-
panying notes 30-34 supra. 
105. 473 F. Supp. at 687. Indeed, Judge Carter of the Southern District of New York 
labeled American Banana as not a seminal decision, but, rather, an aberration, noting 
that it was apparently the only foreign trade case lost by the Department of Justice for 
want of jurisdiction. Id. 
106. Id. at 689. . 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 689-90 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 
U.S. 682 (1976)). 
109. 473 F. Supp. at 685-88. 
110. 425 U.S. at 690. 
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commodities, its right to do so may be conceded so far as the 
federal Constitution is concerned; but the exercise of the right 
is not the performance of a governmental function. . . . When 
a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests it-
self of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the charac-
ter of a trader. 111 
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In so holding, the Court explicitly noted the distinction between a 
state's sovereign and commercial functions, 112 and refused to extend 
the doctrine to situations where the sovereign had descended to the 
level of an entrepreneur.113 
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion,114 stated that he would 
have held that the act of state doctrine exempts such commercial acts 
from judicial scrutiny. He questioned 
the wisdom of attempting the articulation of any broad excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine within the confines of a single 
case. The Court in Sabbatino, aware of the variety of situations 
111. Id. at 696 (citing Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934)). 
112. 425 U.S. at 696-97. In particular, the Court relied on a letter it received from the 
Department of State through its legal adviser which declared: "[W]e do not believe that 
the Dunhill case raises an act of state question because the case involves an act which is 
commercial, and not public in nature." Id. 
Additionally, the Court found support for its position in the new theory of "restric-
tive" sovereign immunity, as espoused by the famed Tate Letter from the Department of 
State to the Attorney General, enunciating the view of the executive toward questions of 
foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 698. For the full text of the letter, see 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 
984-85 (1952). 
The Court also discussed the continuing trend toward a theory of restrictive inimu-
nity as necessitated by the increased participation of sovereigns in the international com-
mercial market. 425 U.S. at 701-03. 
A similar exception to the act of state doctrine is the so·called "Bernstein Excep-
tion" noted in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
There, the Court stated: -
We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary 
responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court 
that application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of 
American foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so 
doing, we of course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to the 
act of state doctrine. We believe this to be no more than an application of the 
classical common-law maxim that "[t]he reason of the law ceasing the law itself 
also ceases." 
Id. at 769 (citations omitted). 
The "Bernstein Exception" was derived from Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaasnsche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), where it was held that in cases in which the 
.executive publically advises the court that the act of state doctrine need not be applied, 
the court should proceed to examine the legal issues raised by the acts of a foreign sover-
eign within its own territory as it would any other legal question before it. Id. at 375-76. 
113. 425 U.S. at 706. 
114. Id. at 714 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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presenting act of state questions and the complexity of the 
relevent considerations, eschewed any inflexible rule in favor of 
a case-by-case approach. . . . The carving out of broad excep-
tions to the doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the careful 
case-by-case approach adopted in Sabbatino. m 
This commercial/political dichotomy that emerged with great clar-
ity in Dunhill, became one of the two critical issues to be determined 
by the Ninth Circuit in International Association of Machinists v. 
OPEC. 116 While the court gave the issue of sovereign immunity with 
respect to commercial activities only a cursory review,117 its analysis of 
this issue remains fundamentally important to an understanding of its 
decision. The court's focus in determining whether activity was com-
mercial or noncommercial centered around the text of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act (FSIA).116 Under the Act, the courts are obliged 
to employ an objective nature-of-the-act test in determining whether 
activity is commercial and, therefore, not immune.119 
The activity under attack in OPEC was price fixing by OPEC, 
which IAM claimed to be commercial since its presumed purpose was 
profit.120 A proper classification of the activity was crucial but by no 
means clear. Debate over the nature of commercial activity vis-a-vis 
state activity was wide ranging. The district court was convinced that 
115. Id. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "the precise 
contours of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, on which the commercial act 
exception is based, are themselves unclear." Id. at n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
116. 649 F.2d at 1354. 
117. Unlike the district court, the court of appeals chose not to apply sovereign im-
munity, but instead, applied the act of state doctrine. Id. at 1357-61. See note 19 supra. 
118. 649 F.2d at 1357-58. For a discussion of the FSIA, see note 14 and accompanying 
text supra. 
119. 649 F.2d at 1357. The FSIA states, in pertinent part: "The commercial character 
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or 
particular transaction or act, rather than to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). Unlike the 
subjective "purpose test," which asks whether the act was undertaken for sovereign ends, 
the "nature test" focuses on the nature of the act itself and is therefore much narrower, 
since even the most commercial activity may be found to manifest some underlying gov-
ernmental purpose. 649 F.2d at 1357 n.6. 
120. 649 F.2d at 1357-58. The court of appeals largely adopted the reasoning of the 
district court, which stated: 
The legislative history in the House Report ••• refer[s] to a foreign state's com-
mercial acts as "those which private persons normally perform," and "of the 
same character as ... might be made by a private person .••• " If the activity 
is one which normally could be engaged in by a private party, it is a commercial 
activity and the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. • • . If the activity is 
one in which only a sovereign can engage, the activity is noncommercial. 
477 F. Supp. at 566-67 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 
[1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6613, 6615). 
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commercial activity was to be defined very narrowly,121 and thus found 
OPEC's activity to be within the range of governmental functions.122 It 
recognized: 
The control over a nation's natural resources stems from 
the nature of sovereignty. By necessity and by traditional 
recognitions, each nation is its own master in respect to its 
physical attributes. The defendants' control over their oil re-
sources is an especially sovereign function because oil, as their 
primary, if not sole, revenue-producing resource, is crucial to 
the welfare of their nations' peoples.123 
The district court was satisfied that OPEC was acting as a sovereign 
and not as a proprietor, particularly since prior to any commercial in-
terest OPEC was found to have had at the time of the trial, it had 
regulated the extraction of oil via taxation and royalty agreements, ac-
tions which were unquestionably sovereign functions.124 
121. 477 F. Supp. at 567. 
122. Id. Specifically, the court recognized that it "can and should examine the stan-
dards recognized under international law. The United Nations, with the concurrence of 
the United States, has repeatedly recognized the principle that a sovereign state has the 
sole power to control its natural resources." Id. The court relied on a resolution of the 
General Assembly, which stated: 
Bearing in mind its resolution 1515 (XV) of 15 December 1960, in which it rec-
·ommended that the sovereign right of every State to" dispose of its wealth and its 
natural resources should be respected, Considering that any measure in this re-
spect must be based on the recognition of the inalienable right of all States 
freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their 
national interests, and in respect for the economic independence of States, . . . 
Declares that; 
1. The right of people and nations to permanent sovereignty over their na-
tional wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned. 
Id. (citing G.A. Res. 1803, § I(l), 17 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/5 R 850 (1962)) (foot-
note omitted). • 
123. 477 F. Supp. at 568. The court went on to cite the testimony of the court-ap-
pointed expert, Dr. M. A. Adelman, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist: 
It is difficult or impossible to separate the OPEC governments as governments 
from their role as oil producers. They began their price fixing role by levying 
taxes on foreign companies operating within their borders. The oil revenues are 
the great bulk of governmental revenues. Indeed for the OPEC nations supply-
ing most of the oil, the oil revenues are the great bulk of the whole national 
product. 
Id. The court also placed reliance on Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where a 
California state program designed to control the marketing of raisins so as to restrict 
i:ompetition and maintain prices was held to be an act of government, since such acts 
were for the benefit and protection of the public welfare. 477 F. Supp. at 568 (citing 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 350). 
124. 477 F. Supp. at 568-69. The district court stated: 
Thus, the defendants were engaging in this governmental conduct setting terms 
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The court of appeals adopted the district court's reasoning and 
gave its own stamp of approval to the notion that decisions about oil 
policy were of the essence of sovereignty to the OPEC nations.1211 This 
essence·of sovereignty, therefore, necessitated an inquiry into the act of 
state doctrine.126 The court concluded that OPEC was indeed acting as 
a sovereign and not in any commercial capacity which would preclude 
consideration of either foreign sovereign immunity or the act of state 
doctrine. 127 
for crude production long before they obtained any ownership in any production 
companies. It necessarily follows that these activities are engaged in by virtue of 
each defendant's status as a sovereign-because these activities preceded any 
proprietary interest. Therefore, the essential nature of the activity is 
governmental. 
Furthermore, this governmental nature does not change merely because the 
medium through which the activity is accomplished has changed. When defen-
dants' obtained ownership interests in their respective oil production companies, 
the media being utilized by the defendants to fix the terms of oil extraction were 
altered and were changed. Through their proprietary interests the nations could 
directly control the establishment of these terms. But this change in format does 
not change the essential nature of the activity which is still governmental. 
As a result, the conclusion is irrefutable that these activities are governmen-
tal in nature. 
Id. at 569 n.14 (emphasis in original). 
The court found further support for its holding in an implicit recognition by th'e 
United States of the sovereign nature of these activities. The court referred specifically 
to consent decrees entered into with the Seven Sister oil companies, granting specific 
"exceptions" and "permissive provisions" to these companies to engage in price fixing 
when required to do so by the law of foreign nations. Id. at 569. 
125. 649 F.2d at 1358. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. Whether in fact OPEC's activities were noncommercial remains an interest-
ing question, notwithstanding the court's conclusion. 
Supporters of OPEC have gone to great pains to construct the logical arguments 
supporting such a position. OPEC itself has been characterized as an association of 
member countries dedicated to the protection of their national interests in the produc-
tion and export of oil. Amuzegar, OPEC in the Context of the Global Power Equation, 4 
J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 221 (1974). OPEC policies themselves have been defended as not 
being inconsistent with customary international law, since international law contains no 
prohibition against monopoly practices in international trade. Shibata, Arab Oil Policies 
and the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 261, 263-64 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Shibata]. See also I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 321-24 (8th ed. 
1955); H. KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 4, 18-21, 29-30. Indeed, the 
United Nations' Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der encourages the formation of producers' associations. Declaration on the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3102, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 
1), U.N. Doc. No. A/9559, item 4(t)(1974). 
OPEC's pricing and production policies have been characterized by such supporters 
not as profit motivated, but rather, as measures designed to assure the continued availa-
bility of a nonrenewable natural resource. Shibata, supra, at 266. The imposition of such 
conservation measures has been said to be 
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Central to the court's reasoning was an analysis of the act of state 
doctrine itself. Judge Choy, writing for the court, began by reiterating 
the doctrine's classic formulation found in Underhill v. Hernandez. 128 
He noted that the doctrine recognizes the "institutional limitations of 
the courts and the peculiar requirements of successful foreign rela-
tions. "129 Acknowledging the necessity of the doctrine, Judge Choy rea-
soned that the executive branch and not the judiciary is most capable, 
indeed, singly permitted, to render judgment concerning issues central 
to our foreign relations.130 
Without hesitation, the court was quick to point out that the act 
of state doctrine had not been severely limited by modern legisla-
tion.131 In support, it cited Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas 
& Oil Co., 132 which rejected the contention that the doctrine had been 
a question which falls readily within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign 
states. Customary international law does not seek to outlaw such a practice, and 
treaties for trade liberalization, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), often allow a general exception in favor of measures relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
Id. Shibata continued, "[i]ndeed, the right of every country freely to dispose of its na-
tional wealth is an integral part of the universally acknowledged principle that a State 
possesses sovereignty over all of its natural resources." Id. at 268 (footnote omitted). 
The language used to explicate the act of state doctrine generally indicated a desire 
on the part of the court to abstain from rendering a judgment due to the serious diplo-
matic and political consequences such judgment might have. The court explicitly defined 
the purposes of the doctrine as an attempt to effect a separation between the judicial 
and executive branches in the conduct of foreign policy. 649 F.2d at 1358-59. The court 
was evidently persuaded by the view that it lacked the authority to issue a decision 
either for or against OPEC since to do so would in effect, represent a meddling with the 
executive's control over foreign policy. Id. In particular, the court was well aware of the 
role of oil in international relations, noting, for example, a judicial recognition in prior 
cases of the growing world energy crisis. Id. at 1360. 
128. 649 F.2d at 1358 (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)). For the 
Underhill formulation, see text accompanying note 55 supra. , 
129. 649 F.2d at 1358. The act of state doctrine was analogized to the political ques-
tion doctrine in domestic law, a rule requiring the courts to defer to the executive and 
the legislature when those branches are better equipped to resolve politically sensitive 
questions. Id. 
130. Id. The court stated: 
Id. 
When the courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sover-
eign acts of states, they risk disruption of our country's international diplomacy. 
The Executive may utilize protocol, economic sanctions, compromise, delay, and 
persuasion to achieve international objectives. ID-timed judicial decisions chal-
lenging the acts of foreign states could nullify these tools and embarass the 
United States in the eyes of the world. 
131. Id. at 1359. See the Sabbatino Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976). For 
the text of section 2 of the Sabbatino Amendment, see note 70 supra. 
132. 649 F.2d at 1359 n.7 (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 
331 F. Supp. 92, 111 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
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"sapped of its vitality and rationale" by the Sabbatino Amendment.133 
Without much inquiry into the finding by the district court that 
OPEC's behavior was noncommercial,13' the court was satisfied that 
Dunhill was inapplicable.135 Dunhill held that purely commercial ac-
tivity may not rise to the level of an act of state and, therefore, would 
not require judicial deference under the act of state doctrine.136 In dis-
tinguishing, both conceptually and pragmatically, the act of state doc-
trine from the more general concept of foreign sovereign immunity and 
the FSIA, 137 the court provided itself with a clever escape from the 
commercial exception carved by the Dunhill Court. Quite simply, the 
court stated that while the FSIA ignores the underlying purpose of a 
state's action, 138 the act of state doctrine does not, 139 since an essential 
element of act of state is· an evaluation of a sovereign's motivations for 
a public interest basis.140 The court's interpretation of Dunhill, cou-
U.S. 950 (1972)). 
133. 649 F.2d at 1359 n.7. 
134. 477 F. Supp. at 568-69 & n.14. 
135. 649 F.2d at 1360. For a discussion of Dunhill, see notes 108-15 and accompany-
ing text supra. 
136. 425 U.S. at 697-98. 
137. 649 F.2d at 1359. While acknowledging a similarity between the two doctrines, 
the court pointed to significant distinctions. Generally, it noted that while sovereign im-
munity speaks to the jurisdiction of the court, act of state is not jurisdictional, but rather 
"a prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in sensitive areas." Id. The court 
further noted: 
Id. 
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law, recognized in the United 
States by statute. It is the states themselves, as defendants, who may claim sov-
ereign immunity. The act of state doctrine is a domestic legal principle, arising 
from the peculiar role of American courts. It recognizes not only the sovereignty 
of foreign states, but also the spheres of power of the co-equal branches of our 
government. 
138. Id. at 1360. Under the FSIA the test for sovereign immunity is the "nature of 
the act" test. See note 107 and accompanying text supra. Until the passage of the FSIA, 
courts had followed a purpose approach. See generally Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria 
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 934 (1965); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 
Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967). 
139. 649 F.2d at 1360. 
140. Id. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 
1976). For a discussion of Timberlane, see notes 88-96 and accompanying text supra. In 
Timberlane, Judge Choy referred to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law's limita-
tion on the deference of American courts: "[A] court in the United States ••• will re-
frain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state by which that state has 
exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests." 549 F.2d at 607 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 
(1965)) (emphasis by the court). Judge Choy also cited the reporter's comment to § 41: 
"Comment d. Nature of act of state. An 'act of state' as the term is used in this Title 
involves the public interests of a state as state, as distinct from its interest in providing 
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pied with the findings of the district court that OPEC's price fixing 
activity had a significant sovereign component, 141 led the court of ap-
peals to the proposition that certain "seemingly commercial activity 
will trigger act of state considerations."m When the state qua state 
acts in the public interest, 
its sovereignty is asserted. The courts must proceed cautiously 
to avoid an affront to that sovereignty. Because the act of state 
doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity address differ-
ent concerns and apply in different circumstances, we find that 
the act of state doctrine remains available when such caution is 
appropriate, regardless of any commercial component of the 
activity involved. 143 
Based on this reasoning, a court may find the act of state doctrine ap-
plicable notwithstanding any ostensibly commercial activities. The 
court cautioned, however, that the inquiry does not end with consider-
ation of the public interest factor. Alluding to the flexible approach 
advanced by Sabbatino, 144 the court adopted as the next step an appli-
cation of the balancing test suggested there by Justice Harlan.145 Ac-
cordingly, it reiterated that the "'touchstone' or 'crucial element' in a 
determination as to the propriety of judicial intervention, is the poten-
tial for interference with our foreign relations. "146 
With this test in mind, the court recognized the significant role 
played by oil in international relations. m The court took explicit no-
tice of the fact that the United States has a substantial interest in the 
"petro-politics" of the Middle East, and that both the executive and 
the means of adjudicating disputes or claims that arise within its territory." Id. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 
(1965)). 
141. 477 F. Supp. at 568. 
142. 649 F.2d at 1360. 
143. Id. at 1360 (emphasis added). 
144. 376 U.S. 400 (1964). For a discussion of Sabbatino, see notes 58-65 and accom-
panying text supra. 
145. 649 F.2d at 1360. In Sabbatino, Justice Harlan observed that "some aspects of 
international law touch more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less impor-
tant the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification 
for exclusivity in the political branches." 376 U.S. at 428. 
146. 649 F.2d at 1360 (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 
607 (9th Cir. 1976)). In Timberlane, Judge Choy expressed the opinion that "[w]e wish 
to avoid 'passing on the validity' of foreign acts. Similarly we do not wish to challenge 
the sovereignty of another nation, the wisdom of its policy, or the integrity and motiva-
tion of its action." 549 F.2d at 607 (citations omitted). 
147. 649 F.2d at 1360. Judge Choy cited the judicial notice taken of such a fact in two 
cases: Occidental of UMM al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 
1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979) and Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 
F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). 
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legislative branches are intimately involved in what is indisputably a 
sensitive area. 148 In eschewing any judicial involvement in a realm best 
left to the executive, the court posited a two-fold justification for re-
maining neutral. To award JAM the relief it sought-an injunction 
against OPEC-would run a substantial risk of affronting the OPEC 
nations themselves, as well as interfering with the efforts of the execu-
tive branch to effect favorable relations with them.1411 Any granting of 
relief would amount to an order by a United States court instructing a 
foreign sovereign to alter its policies of allocating its own natural re-
sources.150 If, on the other hand, the court were to recognize the legal-
ity of OPEC's actions, its bargaining power would be greatly strength-
ened in the event Congress or the Executive should later choose to 
condemn such action.151 Accordingly, Judge Choy, author of the OPEC 
decision, was averse to finding any compelling necessity to render judg-
ment in the case. 
The final substantive issue relevant to the court's holding was the 
availability of internationally accepted legal principles upon which a 
judicial decision could be based. The analysis of Sabbatino again pro-
vided the yardstick for the court.1u Finding no clear international con-
sensus as to the propriety or impropriety of monopoly practices in the 
global community,155 the court, like Justice Harlan in Sabbatino, was 




152. Generally, the Sabbatino holding suggested that courts consider the degree of 
codification and consensus in the global community regarding any particular area of law 
before entering a finding relative to the specific law under consideration. The Court 
wrote: 
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus 
concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for 
the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on 
the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the 
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national inter-
est or with international justice. 
376 U.S. at 428. 
153. The court refused to find any international consensus concerning cartels and 
production agreements despite the suggestion of amici that royalties and production 
quotas were sovereign practices. 649 F.2d at 1361 n.9. The amici cited, inter alia, the 
Connally Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1976), in which 
[i]t is declared to be the policy of Congress to protect· interstate and foreign 
commerce from the diversion and obstruction of, and the burden and harmful 
effect upon, such commerce caused by contraband oil as herein defined, and to 
encourage the conservation of deposits of crude oil situated within the United 
States. 
649 F.2d at 1361 n.9. Also cited by amici were the United States' payments to farmers 
not to produce wheat, and Japan's voluntary reduction of television and automobile pro· 
duction to maintain prices. Id. 
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reluctant to "make" any international law. m 
It is doubtful, however, whether what was required was the formu-
The international perception as to the merits, if any, of monopoly, is, as noted by 
the court, not distinguished by any marked degree of uniformity. For a brief review of 
the antitrust policies of various nations, see W. FuGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE 
ANTITRUST LAws 468-91 (2d ed. 1973). 
That the American perspective as to the impropriety of monopoly is by no means 
the ultimate solution is abundantly clear and evidenced by the myriad criticisms that 
have emerged. See, e.g., Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study 
of the Antitrust Consequences of the Principle Forms of Investment by American Cor-
porations in Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 400, 409 n.39 (1962). For a specific 
instance of this divergence of views, intermeshed with the question of extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law, see British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. 
Ltd., (1953) 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.), where the British appellate court enjoined enforcement of 
several provisions of an antitrust decree. The implications have been interpreted to in-
clude the establishment of the "illegality" of attempts to apply the antitrust laws extra-
territorially. See, e.g., Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of 
the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 641 (1954) ("However backward and benighted the 
United States may think the rest of the world is over the matter of monopolies and 
restraints of trade, the truth is that she cannot, even if she wants to, enforce her sincere 
and deep convictions upon countries whose outlook is entirely different."); Kahn-Freund, 
English Contracts and American Antitrust Laws; The Nylon Patent Case, 18 MoD. L. 
REv. 65 (1955). See also [1980] 963 ANTrrnusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10, which 
reported the adoption by 41 British Commonwealth nations of a resolution against 
Unitea States enforcement of multiple damage antitrust actions. But see Fugate, Anti-
trust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REv. 925 (1963) where the author 
commented: 
[A] reporter's note to the 1961 draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States ••• comments upon the uniformity of antitrust 
decisions on this point and concludes that there is no merit to the argument that 
such "extra-territorial" application of the antitrust laws is contrary to interna-
tional law. As that Note points out, even in British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. 
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., where the British courts refused to permit a 
British company to carry out the order of an American court in an antitrust 
case, the British courts were careful not to say that the American court had 
acted beyond its jurisdiction. 
Id. at 931; Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955), modified, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). 
154. 659 F.2d at 1361. Wheth~r there does in fact exist international law relative to 
extraterritorial application of domestic law is subject to varying interpretations. 
In some instances, it has been common for nations to apply domestic laws to 
acts performed beyond their borders. In general, this extraterritorial application 
has been tolerated when the countries involved have similar laws and tpereby 
agree that the conduct should be regulated. The same has not been true when 
extraterritorial application extends to acts that were not illegal in the country of 
performance. This has been most evident in the areas of"international trade and 
commerce, where approaches to economic regulation, as well as substantive laws, 
rarely coincide. -
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by 
Foreign Countries, 11 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 577, 577-78 (1981) (citations omitted). 
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lation of any new international law.11111 There was certainly enough pre-
cedent to support a finding that some activities, i.e., commercial ones, 
would not be insulated by the act of state doctrine. Dunhill made this 
limitation on act of state perfectly clear.186 The court's failure to apply 
any type of rigorous analysis to the question of commerciality, how-
ever, left it without a basis to hold any way other than it did. 
It is clear that the judicial trend has come full cycle. With the 
OPEC case, a return to the doctrine of American Banana181 and the 
principle of strict territoriality is apparent, albeit seemingly confined 
to antitrust actions brought against foreign nations themselves as op-
posed to corporations operating within foreign locales. The expansive 
jurisdiction asserted by Judge Hand in Alcoa188 has proven to be whol-
ly inapplicable when the actions of a foreign sovereign become ripe for 
judicial scrutiny. Yet, because of the approach taken in OPEC, the 
prospect of any extraterritorial application of United States antitrust 
laws remains clouded. Rather than assert any firm policy or definitive 
statement of the law, the court left through the back door, and simply 
declined to review what are potentially serious international legal com-
plications. Not only does the act of state doctrine provide a convenient 
defense for foreign antitrust violators, but it also shields the court from 
the nasty chore of having to come to terms with the real issues that are 
155. "But it appears that the vast weight of authority and, more importantly, the 
practice of states, indicate that such an application of the antitrust law is perfectly legal 
under the law of nations." Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Vi· 
olations-Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 Omo ST. L.J. 519, 533 (1981). In 
support of the proposition that existing international law is capable of resolving these 
problems, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 18 (1965); P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 64 (1956); Falk, International Juris· 
diction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP L.Q. 295, 300-02 
(1959); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in 
Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1150-52 (1956). 
156. See notes 108-15 and accompanying text supra. The OPEC court could have 
adopted Justice Marshall's analysis in Dunhill as to why Cuba's activity should have 
been viewed as that of a sovereign. Justice Marshall wrote: 
The seizure of the funds, like the initial seizure on September 15, reflected a 
purpose to exert sovereign power to its territorial limits in order to effectuate 
the intervention of ongoing cigar manufacturing business. It matters not that the 
funds have been determined by a United States court in this case to have be· 
longed to Dunhill rather than the cigar manufacturers. What does matter is that 
Cuba retained the money in the course of its program of expropriating what it 
viewed as part and parcel of the business. 
425 U.S. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). It is not unreasonable to 
suggest that under this analysis, OPEC's pricing activities could assume a totally sover· 
eign character if viewed as an integral part of its more general program of resource 
management. 
157. For a discussion of American Banana, see notes 31-33 and accompanying text 
supra. 
158. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. 
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certain to intensify in coming years as the global paths of national 
communities become more and more intertwined. m 
Michael H. Roffer 
159. Fortunately, the court may soon be receiving the help it has been looking for in 
the form of legislation just recently enacted by the Senate. S. 1010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 
126 CONG. REC. S13813 (1981) establishes a Presidential commission to oversee the appli-
cation of the United States antitrust laws to violations occurring broad. For commentary 
on the new legislation, see Wallace, Changing American Antitrust Laws in a Changing 
World, 26 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 609 (1981). 
In addition to the new commission, the Reagan administration has recently made 
clear its policy with respect to the extraterritorial enforcement of the United States anti-
trust laws. Speaking before the Union Internationale des Avocats, Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith commented that there was "some basis in reality for criticism that 
the United States has adopted much too broad a view of its jurisdic~ion over some mul-
tinational economic activities." Taylor, U.S. Revising Antitrust Stancl, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 1, 1981, § D, at 11, col. 1. The Justice Department, Smith continued, will "urge 
United States courts to defer in some international law cases to the policies of foreign 
governments that have the predominant interests in the conduct in question," noting 
that "we think there may be areas where accommodations and adjustments may be made 
that haven't been made in the past to avoid jurisdictional conflicts with foreign coun-
tries." Id. 

